Matrilineal Asset Inheritance, Female Bargaining Power, and Household Welfare in Malawi by Garcia, Nicholas T
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Master's Theses Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects
Spring 5-15-2014
Matrilineal Asset Inheritance, Female Bargaining
Power, and Household Welfare in Malawi
Nicholas T. Garcia
University of San Francisco, ntgarcia@usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/thes
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Econometrics Commons, and the
Other Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @
Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Garcia, Nicholas T., "Matrilineal Asset Inheritance, Female Bargaining Power, and Household Welfare in Malawi" (2014). Master's
Theses. 96.
https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/96
Matrilineal Asset Inheritance, Female Bargaining 
Power, and Household Welfare in Malawi 
 
Master’s Thesis 
International and Development Economics 
 
Key Words: Intrahousehold bargaining, divorce threat, child anthropometry, food consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicholas Garcia 
 
Department of Economics 
University of San Francisco 
2130 Fulton St. 
San Francisco, CA 94117 
 
e-mail: ntgarcia@usfca.edu 
 
May 2014 
 
 
Abstract: Matrilineal inheritance practices in Malawi exogenously 
determine female land holdings at the time of marriage, allowing for 
the identification of the effect of increased female bargaining power on 
household consumption decisions. I use the matrilineal ethnicity of the 
head of household as an instrument for the share of total household 
land inherited by the female head or male head’s wife. I find that child’s 
height-for-age decreases with female assets, and evidence suggesting 
increased consumption from households’ own production. Since the 
food basket from own consumption is high in carbs but not nutritious, 
long-term child health suffers despite receiving more resources than 
their peers. This paper uses an extensive data set from Malawi to 
explore the nature of both cooperative and noncooperative household 
bargaining. 
 
 
 
This paper was written to satisfy the requirements for the Master’s  thesis in International & Development Economics at 
the University of San Francisco, with primary advisement from Professor Elizabeth Katz, PhD. The author wishes to 
thank Professors Katz, Wydick, Anttlia-Hughes, Stopnitzky and Cassar for their invaluable assistance with this project. 
The author also wishes to thank the World Bank LSMS-ISA team— Talip Kilic, Jon Kastelic, Heather Moylan— and the 
IHS3 team at the National Statistics Office of Malawi — including, Shelton Kanyanda, Clement Mtengula, and Innocent 
Phiri. The author will forever be thankful for the guidance and friendship of the IDEC class of 2014. 
  
2
1. Introduction 
 
In many countries, women are systematically discriminated against through socio-cultural 
practices and institutions. The differences in female agency manifest themselves in many ways, 
including: through marriage and reproduction practices, the way in which women earn and control 
household income, inheritance practices and laws, and expectations over contributions to household 
production. Female empowerment and increasing gender equity have become major motivations 
behind many development programs, and it is common for programs to be targeted toward women. 
Major progress has been made in improving the lives of poor women, and the world has achieved its 
Millennium Development Goal of gender equality for primary school education. Despite these 
major gains, gender empowerment remains a looming issue, even in rich countries such as the 
United States where women are paid less and do not have many of the same advancement 
opportunities as men. The pursuit of gender equal society begets many questions over mechanisms 
through which women actually become more empowered, how these shifts affect household 
bargaining dynamics, and their affect on household welfare in traditional heterosexual marriages.  
A mounting body of literature has explored the relationship between intrahousehold 
bargaining and household welfare. Many studies in this literature find that female controlled income 
is more likely to be allocated toward household public goods and human capital investments for 
children, as compared to incomes controlled by men. Analysis of this hypothesis has been 
conducted for a number of indicators such as food consumption, nutrition, health expenditures, 
education expenditures, and child anthropometric outcomes (Doepke & Tertilt, 2011; Duflo, 2003). 
Furthermore, the findings are robust to studies in both poor and rich countries, agricultural and 
non-agricultural contexts, and variation in bargaining power resulting from from natural or program 
shocks. 
Household cooperative bargaining models predict that shifts in bargaining power lead to 
shifts in weighting toward female preferences, subsequently influencing the way in which household 
incomes are allocated. To the extent that women are relatively selfless and weight other household 
members’ welfare higher than men, more bargaining power should mean a shift toward other 
members’ welfare. However, intrahousehold bargaining may not necessarily result in a Pareto-
optimal shift, and in fact, a large body of empirical has shown that this is often not the case in 
agricultural contexts. This was first illustrated in Udry’s (1996) test of the unitary household model 
in Burkina Faso, showing that the distribution of resources matters in plot productivity and that 
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households do not optimally redistribute to other household members Thus the literature suggests 
that bargaining in rural context may be more appropriately modeled through a Nash bargaining 
model, and the welfare of individuals within the household may be more or less depending on the 
distribution of income between decision makers (Doepke & Tertilt, 2011).  
In Malawi, a poor, landlocked country of mostly subsistence, smallholder farmers, the ways 
in which household incomes are employed may have particularly salient effects on household utility 
and individual outcomes. Cultivation in Malawi is almost entirely rainfed, and farm incomes are 
often very susceptible to seasonal income shocks and perennially experience a severe hunger season, 
thus even small changes in household expenditures may be consequential for households living on 
the margin. 
To better understand how female bargaining power affects the realization of household 
expenditure decisions, I analyze the impact of female land inheritance on child health indicators and 
household expenditures. Since the relationship between bargaining power and asset inheritance is 
likely endogenous — i.e., it is unclear whether girls with more bargaining power are more likely to 
inherit land or if land inheritance is likely to result in bargaining power — I exploit differences in 
matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic heritage of the household head to instrument for inheritance. 
Ethnic identity is salient amongst contemporary Malawians and ethnicity is exogenously determined 
for each individual at the time of birth. Matriliny of the household head controls for endogeneity in 
inherited land. Since land is passed down along the female line at the time of marriage, matriliny 
should predict the endowment of female bargaining power at the time of entering the marriage 
agreement. Amongst patrilineal groups, in which a bride price is expected at the time of marriage, 
women generally do not inherit any land and women’s primary mode of obtaining access to land is 
via marriage.  
Using a nationally representative data set from Malawi, I analyze the effect of female land 
inheritance on household expenditure shares, expenditures on clothing, and child anthropometric 
outcomes. I find that children in households with greater female inherited land show evidence of 
being stunted and these households are more likely to consume food from their own-crop 
production, which are the least nutritious and least expensive foods in the household food basket. I 
show that Malawian women in households in which the female head has inherited more land actually 
control a large share of household income but there is no difference in the share of income that is 
jointly controlled by men and women. This study is one of the first to leverage matrilineal 
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inheritance to study female bargaining power in this context and contributes to the bargaining 
literature by observing expenditure outcomes and human capital outcomes. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the theoretical 
literature on household bargaining and income sharing, as well as a survey of the related empirical 
literature; Section 3 provides an overview of my methodology and analytical framework; Section 4 
presents and discusses results; and Sections 5 offers closing remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Household Bargaining Theoretical Literature 
Nash bargaining models offer a good starting point within the intrahousehold bargaining 
literature, since they were some of the first cooperative, non-unitary models to be developed. In a 
cooperative game model, Manser and Brown (1980) propose that husband and wife have unique 
preferences, and they reach an agreement on the optimal level of consumption and leisure. 
Households form if the marriage payout is greater than the payout for the individual in the single 
state.  Households in this model are able to reach a Pareto optimum equilibrium, with the 
assumption that preferences are fully known (McElroy and Horney, 1981).  
 The Nash equilibrium is generalized in the collective model, in which the single state is as a 
“threat point”, defined as the utility obtained by an outside option (in the case of divorce). The 
optimum level of consumption is determined, in part, by the other member’s threat of divorce, 
which serves as a mechanism to keep the members within the cooperative game. The household 
maximizes the Nash product function, where utility is a function of consumption of husband (h) 
and wife (w) and the threat of the outside option with value T. In this case, the threat is a vector of 
factors Z that are determined by individual characteristics and the marriage market in the case of 
divorce. 
 
An interesting result of this model is that if Z is influenced by yh  or yw then the income 
pooling result observed in the unitary model doesn’t hold, and demand is indeed affected by the 
allocation of income to each member. Chiappori and Browning develop an extension of this model 
in which the second household member’s utility is weighted by their bargaining power within the 
household (1998). Thus, the cooperative equilibrium and household utility (uH) is dependent on 
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prices, individuals’ preferences, their independent incomes, and the distribution of power function µ. 
Their model can be summarized as follows: 
 
The threat of the dissolution of marriage induces household decision makers to cooperate, 
but the distribution of income within the game can affect household outcomes if the distribution of 
income affects the relative welfare weighting between men and women. This will only be the case if 
shifts in income change the relative share of incomes after divorce. Thus, in the context of the 
divorce threat model, we expect that the relative endowments of assets at the time of marriage 
should be particularly relevant to household decision making when the original owners of the are 
able to hold on to them in case of divorce. Shifts in incomes that occur within the marriage, but 
cannot be definitively claimed by husband and wife after divorce, should be irrelevant to household 
bargaining power. 
Lundberg & Pollak (1994) present some of the first noncooperative models of household 
bargaining, in which household members do not pool their individual incomes. Instead, members 
make independent consumption decisions by maximizing their utility subject to their separate budget 
constraint, while taking the decisions of the other household members as given. They present a 
simple two person household model in which individuals decide consumption of private goods x 
and public goods q, which are consumed by both husband and wife. The husband chooses xh and qh 
to maximize Uh(xh, q) subject to q = q
h + qw and Xh + pq
h = Ih where p is the price of the public good, 
Ih is the husband's income and q
w is the public-good contribution of the wife. In this set up, the 
husband has a best response to the wife’s contribution to public goods and vice-versa, which will 
determine each’s optimal contribution.  
An important outcome of this model is that husband and wife will directly respond to the 
public good contributions of the opposite household member relative to their partner’s exogenous 
income. Thus each member’s reservation utility would be their utility given that their partner does 
not contribute anything to public goods. In the infinite form of this game, self-evident strategies 
may emerge that are reinforced by social norms and expected familial roles. Thus, the distribution of 
household income can significantly change both the provision of public goods as well as the overall 
utility of the household. The separate spheres model allows for within marriage equilibria that 
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include situations in which the optimum solution is for members to specialize in goods provision, 
rather than both contributing. The threat point in this model is the noncooperative equilibrium in 
which household contributions are enforced through social expectations, and the cooperative 
outcome occurs when members are able to come to an agreement regarding contribution. Thus, the 
threat point can occur within the marriage and be influenced by the distribution of income, whereas 
the threat point in the cooperative divorce model is the value of the outside option.  
In the context of this study, land inheritance may influence female bargaining power through 
either model by increasing the value of a woman’s outside option in the case of divorce or by 
increasing her relative income, thereby making the within-marriage cooperative outcome more likely. 
Among matrilineal women, the divorce threat option is more relevant compared to patrilineal 
women, since patrilineal women typically do not inherit any land and have few claims to household 
assets in the case of divorce (given that divorce is a real option).  
 
2.2 Empirical Literature  
A sizeable empirical literature exists documenting the link between empowerment and 
household welfare. It is well documented that female empowerment promotes development, and 
studies have found that higher female resources are associated with better outcomes for children. 
Hoddinot and Haddad (1995) use data from Cote d’Ivoire and find that increased female income 
leads to higher expenditure shares on food and lower expenditures of alcohol and cigarettes. In a 
1994 study with the same data, the authors find that female income share leads to higher height-for-
age measurements for children, suggesting that female income share leads to more food allocation 
toward children.   
These findings have been observed in other contexts as well. Engle (1993) finds that wife’s 
income in Canada is associated with higher child and food expenditures. Kennedy and Peters (1992) 
find that female-headed households spend a larger share of their budgets on food, and find better 
anthropometric outcomes for children. Interestingly, the authors use a de facto definition of 
household head that takes into account whether the stated or legal household head is absent from 
the home more than 50% of the time. This suggests that their findings are a better representation of 
the true balance of power within the household compared to other studies that only look at stated 
control.  
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Duflo and Udry (2004) find that rainfall shocks that increase female incomes leads to a 10 
percent increase in purchased foods, while the relationship with male income changes are negative. 
Duflo (2003) finds that children in South Africa have better weight-for-age and height-for-age 
outcomes when their maternal grandmothers earn a pension, but find no effect when grandfathers 
or paternal grandmothers earn a pension. The effect is quite large: girls in households in which the 
maternal grandmother is a pension recipient have 1.19 SDs larger weight-for-height. 
Attanasio and Lechene (2002) find that PROGRESA beneficiaries in Mexico have increased 
expenditure shares of boys’ and girls’ clothing resulting from increases in female income. Rubalcava, 
Teruel, and Thomas (2009) and Bobonis (2009) also confirm that higher percentage of female 
income leads to larger expenditures on child clothing.  
Claudia Martínez (2013) has a much more recent study that points to the validity of the 
noncollective bargaining model by using a change in the child support rights for children born out 
of wedlock in Chile. In her study, a policy change increasing the level for support for these children 
differentially and exogenously benefits female incomes and bargaining power. Employing a 
difference-in-differences strategy, she finds significant decreases in male employment and increases 
in child school attendance. The increase in school attendance is interpreted as a movement toward 
female preferences (the child is not related to the male cohabitator) as a result of the increase in 
bargaining power. Martínez interprets the decrease in male employment as a “tax” on male utility as 
a result of lower bargaining power. Since this doesn’t correct any misallocations, there is greater 
inefficiency in household allocation. 
In a key paper by Kennedy and Peters (1992), the authors find that female-headed 
households in Kenya and Malawi spend less on sin goods such as alcohol. They also find that these 
households spend more money of food and overall caloric intake.  
While many of these studies struggle to identify a causal relationship, there is a consistency 
among the findings across many contexts and datasets.  This suggests that the results indicating that 
more female empowerment leads to higher expenditures on food, education, and child goods are 
likely externally valid and are consistent with the findings in this study. Furthermore, this literature 
suggests strong evidence that female empowerment benefits child anthropometric outcomes, which 
are better measures of effective transfers toward children than expenditure shares since 
measurement is standardized and do not rely on respondent reporting.  
 
2.2 Matrilineal Inheritance in Malawi 
  
8
  Tribes in Malawi typically follow matrilineal or patrilineal inheritance lines. Women in 
matrilineal ethnic groups are considered to have more power since they have access to land. 
Typically, land is passed down to women at the time of marriage from the parents. In patrilineal 
ethnic groups, women are much less autonomous and do not have access to land through 
inheritance. For matrilineal groups, male access to land occurs primarily through marriage and the 
man has no claim to land owned by his wife in the case of divorce. The opposite is true in patrilineal 
groups, women access land through their husbands’ endowment and have no claims when they 
divorce. These inheritance practices imply that men in matrilineal households and women in 
patrilineal households have lower assets at the time of marriage and less valuable divorce options 
since they hold no residual claim to land cultivated by the household (Kishindo 2010). Malawi has 
one of the highest divorce rates in Africa so the divorce threat is credible. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 I use nationally representative data from the Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey 
(IHS3) from 2010/2011. The survey data contain a rich set of household and community variables 
for approximately 12,300 households, including plot-level agricultural data from rainy and dry season 
yields. Only land cultivating households are included in the sample. Up to two household members 
could be listed as owners of a particular plot but the inheritance question did not indicate who 
among the owners was the inheritor. Consequently, I restrict my land inheritance variable to account 
for only households with at least one plot that was uniquely owned by a female household head or 
wife of the male household head. Since many inherited plots were jointly owned by both men and 
women, the results should be interpreted conservatively. My final overall sample for which all 
covariates were not missing included 6205 households. 
Household gross annual income was calculated by the World Bank using a Rural Income 
Generating Activities (RIGA) methodology, which was developed by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (Quiñones, de la O-Campos, Rodríguez-Alas, Hertz, & Winters, 2009). Real annual 
consumption for each household and data on annual expenditures for health, education, food, 
tobacco/alcohol, and clothing are directly available from the LSMS-ISA data. Income and asset 
control is defined distinctly from generation and ownership, allowing for more accurate analysis of 
effective control over household resources.  
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Anthropometric data from the Household Questionnaire were converted into BMI-for-age 
and height-for-age z-scores according to 2007 World Health Organization definitions using the user-
written STATA command zanthro. Only children with scores within five SDs of the mean were kept 
to exclude extreme outliers from the sample. Ethnic identity is inferred from the language spoken at 
home, which was asked of the household head only. While many Malawians are multilingual, a 
critical assumption of this analysis is that ethnic identity corresponds to the ethno-lingual identity 
elicited from this question and that there is no interethnic marriage. Since ethnic identity and home-
village identity is important to Malawians, and internal migration rates are low, I believe that these 
assumptions are reasonable. Furthermore, if these assumptions were not to hold — say that 
matrilineal men are marrying patrilineal women, or matrilineal households are speaking patrilineal 
languages — the resulting 2SLS estimators would be downward biased.  
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 Female bargaining power and her control over inherited assets may be endogenous if parents 
bequeath land to daughters who exhibit higher returns to marriage, who are more productive, or 
have other unobservable characteristics that are correlated with bargaining power within the 
marriage. To control for these endogeneity concerns, I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
instrumental variables strategy with a dummy for matriliny of the head’s ethnic groups as an 
instrument for the share of total household land inherited by the head female. Since one is not able 
to select into the ethnic group that they are born into and ethno-linguistic identity is salient in 
Malawian culture, matriliny is an exogenous predictor of assets controlled by women at the time of 
marriage. I control for household characteristics, interview month, and characteristics of the female 
and male heads to account for household expenditure decisions. The critical assumption of my 
identification strategy is that matriliny affects outcomes only through female bargaining power 
within these specific ethnic groups. To control for biases that are associated with outcomes and 
matriliny, I control for geographic region and per capita household expenditures as well. Thus, 
conditional on these characteristics, matrilineal ethnic identity and land inheritance can be thought 
of as being as good as randomly assigned. 
Furthermore, this exclusion restriction should hold if factors that proxy female bargaining 
power are monotonically correlated with female inherited land share and matriliny is not correlated 
with other factors that affect outcomes.  
      
	
  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10
      …      
  
    
	
    (2) 
      
	
    (3) 
 
 
  Share of household land owned and inherited by head female or male 
  Dummy for matrilineal ethnic group of household head 
  expenditure outcome 
  Anthropometric z 0 score for BMI or height 
4  Household index 
6  Child index 
 
In equation (1), I estimate the first stage value Li the share of household total land that was inherited 
by the head female for household i on the instrument, a dummy M matrilineal ethnic identity, and a 
set of covariates. In equation (2), the outcome variables yi are household annual expenditure shares 
on various goods and the log of household expenditures on male, female, and child clothing 
respectively. The regressors in the second stage are the instrumented variable Li and the covariates 
from the first stage X’. For the final set of analyses, I estimate anthropometric outcomes for child j 
in household i (3), with the first stage following the same form as in the previous analyses (1).  
 
4. Results & Discussion 
3.1 Summary of Sample 
Table 1 in the Appendix shows the summary statistics for the sample. the regional 
distribution of matrilineal ethnic groups in Malawi. The majority (76%) of households belong to 
matrilineal ethnic groups, with an overall average of 39.11% of household land owned and inherited 
by the male head and 27.06% by the female.  The majority of households in the sample were very 
small farmers, with an average total land area of 2 acres and approximately 30% cultivating 1 acre or 
less. Only 12% of households live in urban areas, which is reflective of Malawi on the whole, in 
which the vast majority of households are rural. 
Table 2 shows the regional breakdown of matriliny in the sample: the Central and Southern 
regions are mostly matrilineal ethnicities, whereas the extreme opposite is true in the Northern 
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region, where only 10% of the sample is matrilineal. The colinearity of inheritance structure with 
region suggests that specifications that include regional fixed effects are more reliable. Table 3 shows 
that women in matrilineal household inherit significantly more land than their patrilineal 
counterparts; while men in patrilineal households inherit significantly more land than their 
matrilineal counterparts. Though overall, men inherit significantly more land than women.  
These unconditional differences in land inheritance are strong evidence that the matriliny is 
strongly predictive of both female and male land inheritance. Many households reported that land 
was inherited and owned by both men and women, though only one person in the husband and wife 
relationship is able to inherit a single plot of land. Since these plots were excluded from the count of 
inherited plots but included in total household land area, this distribution represents a lower bound 
on inheritance.  
 
3.2 Instrument Validity 
Table 3 shows the correlations between matriliny and female and male inheritance, respectively. The 
estimates indicate that matriliny is correlated with both the female and male share of inherited land. 
A correlation of approximately 20% for female share suggests that 2SLS estimates should not suffer 
from bias due to matriliny being a weak instrument.  
 
Table 4. Correlations Between Share of Inherited Land and Matriliny 
  Female Share Male Share Matriliny 
Female Share 1 
Male Share -0.517 1 
Matriliny 0.198 -0.073 1 
 
 
I report coefficients on the matriliny dummy in all results tables, the corresponding first-
stage F-statistic for the exclusion of the matriliny dummy, and the degrees of freedom.  Generally, 
the F-Statistics for the first stage without controls is much higher than estimates with regional fixed 
effects. Since matriliny is highly correlated with region, this is to be expected, but the F-stats are near 
10, which is the general rule of thumb when using 2SLS. Furthermore, point estimates and 
significance levels do not change much when employing regional fixed effects with the 2SLS 
technique, even when F-stats are below 10.  
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3.3 Balance Between Matrilineal and Patrilineal Households 
 One concern is that my instrument is not truly exogenous, and so other factors besides 
female inherited land that are correlated with child anthropometry and household decision making 
would bias the results of my analysis. Table 5 reports unconditional differences in means between 
matrilineal and patrilineal households for a number of household characteristics and behavior. In 
general, I find that there is considerable balance across matriliny with the exception of household 
size, total land area, participation in non-agricultural work, livestock ownership and receipt of 
transfers.  
 Concerns about differences in household size and participation in non-agricultural labor are 
addressed directly in my specifications as controls. Furthermore, when I conduct the analysis with 
household total land, livestock, and receipt of transfers in the regressions, the significance levels, 
point estimates, and F-stats on inherited land do not change (This is true for child anthropometry 
outcomes and for food consumption outcomes). It is important to note that households have the 
same levels of income, education, receipt of social assistance, and employment. Thus, Table 5 
suggests that there is considerable balance between households across matrilineal ethnic group, and 
that the results of my analysis when controlling for these differences are attributable to the 
instrumented variation in inherited land share and not from outside factors.  
  
3.4 Child Anthropometry 
My sample was equally split between boys and girls. The average child in the sample is 1.34 
SDs below the average height-for-age z-score and 0.58 SDs above the average BMI-for-age z-score. 
While the 2007 WHO definitions are based on Western distributions of these anthropmetric 
variables, the data suggest that children in Malawi exhibit low to moderate stunting. In fact, 31% of 
the children in the sample have height-for-age z-scores that are less than 2 SDs away from the 
average indicating moderate stunting, and more than 10% of the children exhibit extreme stunting 
(>3 SDs below average). BMI-for-age is widely considered a more contemporaneous measure of 
overall health of the child, whereas height-for-age is a long-term indicator of past child health. This 
finding is not surprising since Malawi’s subsistence farmers perennially experience months of hunger 
after the rainy season harvest has been totally consumed but before the dry season crop is ready for 
harvest. 
The second stage results for child anthropometry are found below in Table 6. In the most 
restricted regressions, I estimate that a one percentage point increase in female inherited land share 
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increases BMI z-score by 0.041 SDs but a decrease in height-for-age by 0.026 SDs. These 
coefficients on female inherited land do not change greatly when I do not include regional fixed 
effects and per capita expenditures. A rich set of controls is included in all specifications including 
household structure to account for income pressure and interview month to control for seasonal 
changes correlated with income and nutrition that would affect z-scores. The sign, significance, and 
magnitude are also robust to specifications that include log per capita real annual expenditures.   
I run the analysis on the same outcomes using OLS (Table 7) and find that the effect of 
female inherited land is still negative for height and positive for BMI, though the point estimates are 
a tenth of the magnitude as the 2SLS estimates. The findings for height for age are robust to 
specifications that only include matrilineal households and patrilineal households, but the tenuous 
relationship goes away when I divide the sample for the BMI outcome. 
These findings show that child health outcomes are correlated with land inheritance by 
women. Furthermore, this is caused by differences in male and female consumption preferences, 
mediated by the relative bargaining power endowment through land inheritance. It is interesting that 
as female bargaining power increases, contemporaneous health measures improve but long-term 
health declines. One plausible explanation is that more empowered women may allocate larger 
shares of household resources toward children, which is consistent with the literature, but these 
transfers are coming from incomes over which they have the most control over — namely carb-rich, 
nutrient-poor staples from their own production. Thus, these children may be benefit in the short-
run from these food transfers, but not in the long-run, leaving them higher BMIs while they are 
nonetheless stunted.  
Since I am identifying the effect of female inherited land on child anthropometry, it is 
expected that transfers from women to children would be those associated with having more land 
assets — namely crops from their own production. The most accessible and by far the most popular 
crops are staple foods such as maize and cassava, which are high carb but low nutrient foods. In the 
accounts of household expenditures, these foods are also the least expensive when compared to the 
most nutrient rich foods such as meats, fruits, and vegetables that are in far lower supply — 
especially among very rural farmers. Thus, evidence of increased food consumption from own crop 
production and a low-nutrient household food basket would suggest that the anthropometric 
differences observed are indeed being driven by differences in household consumption decisions. 
This is a hypothesis that I test in the following sections.  
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Furthermore, men in households with more female assets may be induced into wage labor to 
increase the value of their own income sphere, given that they do not hold any residual claim to the 
household’s land. Thus, female land inheritance may lead to greater male control over disposable 
cash incomes necessary to purchase higher quality goods for the household or to serve as self-
insurance for agricultural products that have higher initial investments or risk (e.g., livestock, cash 
crops, tree crops and more perishable food crops). This would suggest that men may be better 
positioned to purchase high value foods or to grow high valued crops not grown on female 
controlled plots. Given that previous studies have found decreased investments in household public 
goods and food when men control more income, we would expect to find that female inherited land 
share predicts higher incidence of male participation in wage labor, lower food consumption, and 
lower consumption of high-quality foods. I test this corollary wage labor hypothesis in the following 
sections. 
 
3.5 Household Consumption 
Second stage estimates for household expenditure shares on female land share are shown in 
Table 8. When controlling for a rich set of covariates, a one-percentage point increase in the share of 
household land that is female-inherited land leads to a 0.14 percentage point decrease in the share of 
annual food expenditures. When multiplied by the average share of land that is female-head 
inherited, I find that these households spend nearly 5 percentage points less on food relative to 
overall expenditures compared to their counterparts in which the head female inherited no land. 
Expenditures were annualized and include expenditures from own crop production — so we would 
expect households with more female inherited land to have lower food expenditures if they are 
consuming less expensive foods from own crop production. Table 8, shows that households 
consume more from own production as female inherited land increases: a ten-percentage point 
increase land share increases own crop expenditures by one percentage point.  An increase in 
female-inherited land share also leads to an increase in household expenditures on clothing, but has 
no effect on other household expenditures.  
I further break down food consumption by food type (Table 9), and I find that households 
with more female inherited land consume carbohydrates more often and animal products less often. 
The outcome variable is very rough — the aggregate number of days that the household consumed 
food of that type over the past seven days — but the findings are consistent with a priori 
expectations when controlling for interview month. This supports the hypothesis that households 
  
15
with a greater share of female inherited land consume lower quality foods. A food basket high in 
carbohydrates but low in animal products would also be less expensive when accounting for 
expenditures, so higher food consumption would not necessarily lead to higher food expenditure 
share if these foods were low quality. Taken together, these results provide very suggestive, albeit 
circumstantial, evidence that households are consuming more, lower-quality foods, which would 
well-explain the findings of the analysis on child anthropometry. 
To test whether households are allocating non-food resources toward children, I also 
estimate the effect on expenditure levels on clothing by gender, and I find that female inheritance is 
associated with higher expenditures on girls’ clothing and child clothing (Table 10).  Interestingly, I 
find that households also spend significantly more on mens’ clothing. Martinez (2013) found a 
similar positive relationship with male goods and suggested that it may indicate a subsidy going to 
compensate for having less bargaining power in the household dynamic. 
 There is certainly unaccounted for selection for positive expenditures on these clothing 
goods but, for households with non-zero expenditures, these regressions indicate that more 
inherited land going to women is associated with higher expenditures on goods for children.  
 
3.6 Income Control 
 To better understand the mechanisms through which female bargaining power may be 
working, I use logit estimation to see what affect female inherited land share has on participation in 
wage labor by gender. Table 11 reports those results, and I find that female asset inheritance predicts 
higher rates of participation for men but not for women. When broken down by matrilineal and 
patrilineal households, I find that the relationship holds for matrilineal households only. Again, this 
finding is consistent matrilineal men would have the least claim to assets owned outside of the 
marriage and would thus gave lower valued outside options. This would induce them to participate 
in wage labor more.  
Finally, I test whether women in households with greater shares of inherited land actually 
control greater shares of household income (Table 12). I find that female inheritance predicts greater 
income control by women and lower income control, both overall and when broken down by 
matriliny. For every one-percentage point increase in the share of total land inherited by the head 
female, female control over household income increases by 0.27 percentage points. This result is 
large and significant at the one percent level, which is particularly interesting as the outcome variable 
was constructed using incomes controlled by all female household members, not just the female 
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head. I expect that if land inheritance of all women were included in the analysis the relationship 
would be even larger. 
 Interestingly, female inheritance does not predict any difference in the share of incomes 
jointly controlled by men and women, though the coefficient is positive. While there are concerns 
about an endogenous relationship between female inheritance and control over income, these results 
corroborate the divorce threat and separate spheres framework of my analysis. In the divorce threat 
model, only incomes that accrue to men and women in the case of divorce affect the household 
bargaining process. Thus, while cooperative and unitary household bargaining models might predict 
higher joint control shares as a result of more female asset control, the divorce threat model suggests 
further distinction of female and male income control. Thereby increasing the utility of the divorce 
option and inducing the Nash bargaining optimum. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 My results provide strong evidence against the unitary household model, corroborating the 
findings of recent work within the intrahousehold bargaining literature. I find that greater female 
asset holdings through matrilineal inheritance are associated with higher BMI-for-age and lower 
height-for-age z-scores. Further, I find that inheritance leads to significant differences in 
expenditures on food and clothing, in consumption from own-crop production, in male 
participation in wage labor, and in the share of income controlled by men and women. This suggests 
that households with more female assets allocate more resources toward children as a result of 
higher female bargaining power. These findings are consistent with the divorce threat theoretical 
framework upon which I build my analysis and  
 I am able to identify the impact of female bargaining power on decision-making through 
differential land inheritance regimes that are dictated exogenously at the time of birth through 
Malawian matrilineal ethnic heritage. Thanks to the level of detail in the IHS3 household 
questionnaire, I am able to differentiate between the gender of the income generator and the gender 
of the income control for the universe of income generating channels in the household. While 
acknowledging the possible endogeneity of the result, I show that women in households with a 
higher share of female inherited land holdings control significantly more of household income. 
Conversely, female inherited land holdings are not correlated with male-female joint income control. 
This finding supports the divorce threat framework since household utility is only optimized in the 
presence of a credible and salient outside option, in this case, control over income after divorce. 
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 As is the case with all analyses employing instrumental variables, my estimates should be be 
considered carefully and in context with previous intrahousehold bargaining literature, since it is 
impossible to prove that my single instrumental variable of matrilineal ethnic group satisfies the 
exclusion restriction. As is the case with all macro-variables used as instruments (weather, political 
change, etc.), culture may influence outcome variables outside of the channel that I am looking at. 
However, I am able to show that there is balance across matrilineal lineage and I control for 
important differences in my specifications, such that my results are at least suggestive of differences 
in decision-making based on bargaining power.  
 These findings suggest a number of policy implications. Firstly, policies that aim to solidify 
female land ownership such as land titling and inheritance laws may effect larger shares of female 
control over income and bargaining power within the household. Institution building that seeks to 
empower women, especially those women who belong to patrilineal ethnic groups, may be well 
intentioned but could result in unintended health consequences for children if not paired with 
complementary programs to improve the household food basket. Greater female control over assets 
may increase intrahousehold transfers toward children, but my findings suggest that these transfers 
are increases in quantity and not necessarily quality. Government subsidy programs such as the Farm 
Input Subsidy Program have induced intensified production of improved maize varieties, and 
increases in female land assets are likely to result in more female incomes through own maize 
production. This, and similar programs, may not adequately improve outcomes for children in the 
household, even when transfers go to women. In fact, land inheritance and farm investment 
programs may serve as disincentives for income and crop diversification since they are direct 
subsidies for increasing agricultural intensity. Thus, a woman may see that children would benefit 
from a different income generating strategy that would grant her access to more nutritious foods or 
long-term investments, but her bargaining power, future incomes, and future sources of government 
subsidies rest in her endowment of land.  
 To my knowledge this is the first paper to leverage matrilineal ethnic identity to control for 
endogeneity in gendered asset inheritance as a measure of intra-marriage bargaining power. While a 
number of studies have established links between intrahousehold bargaining and household 
expenditures, my ability to observe the effects of bargaining power on child anthropometry and 
actual gender control over incomes is rare in a nationally representative sample. A better 
identification strategy may have been possible if the sample also included characteristics of the 
respondents’ parents. With of the first nationally representative panel sample soon to be published, 
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future work on household bargaining in Malawi should be able to better control for endogeneity 
concerns in the data. 
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6. Appendix 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
VARIABLE Obs Mean SD 
  
VARIABLE Obs Mean SD 
Fem Inherited Land Share 
(%) 
6205 28.61 43.99 
  
HH Expenditure Shares (%) 
  
Male Inherited Land Share 
(%) 
6205 38.61 46.73 
  
Food 6205 64.1 13.81 
HH Total Land Area (Acre) 6205 2.02 1.87   Clothing 6205 2.75 3.93 
Matriliny 6205 0.76 0.43   Housing 6205 0.15 0.09 
          Health 6205 1.32 3.23 
Child Age (Mo.) 4701 32.46 15.05   Edu 6205 1.19 3.01 
Child Male 4701 0.5 0.5   Alcohol 6205 2.77 6.31 
Height-for-age 4701 -1.34 1.51           
BMI-for-age 4701 0.58 1.48   Female Share of HH (%)     
          Under 5 6205 8.92 12.66 
Male Head 6205 1 0.05   5 to 9 6205 5.79 9.76 
Head Age 6205 40.74 14.69   10 to 19 6205 10.6 13.99 
HH Size 6205 5.15 2.06   20 to 65 6205 21.24 11.45 
Christian 6205 0.82 0.39   Over 65 6205 1.28 6.61 
Muslim 6205 0.12 0.33           
Partic. Non-Agr 6205 0.54 0.5   Male Share of HH (%)     
Urban 6205 0.09 0.29   Under 5 6205 8.91 12.65 
Head Educ Level 6205 1.47 0.81   5 to 9 6205 5.69 9.65 
Fem Head Educ Level 6205 1.33 0.76   10 to 19 6205 9.23 13.24 
Maize Cultivator 6205 0.97 0.16   20 to 65 6205 22.65 11.95 
Tobacco Cultivator 6205 0.17 0.38   Over 65 6205 2.32 8.78 
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Table 2. Regional Breakdown of Sample 
Region Obs Matrilineal 
Northern 939 10.33% 
Central 2370 90.89% 
Southern 2906 85.31% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Share of Inherited Land by Matrilineal Ethnicity 
  Matrilineal Patrilineal t-stat 
Female Inherited Share 35.66 12.56 15.87*** 
Male Inherited Share 38.83 56.77 -8.44*** 
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Table 5. Unconditional Differences Between Matrilineal and Patrilineal Households 
  Coefficient SE t-stat p-value 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Urban 0.020 0.020 0.980 0.328 
Income 1783.706 10458.710 0.170 0.865 
HH size -0.285*** 0.096 -2.960 0.003 
Total land area -0.210** 0.094 -2.240 0.025 
Tobacco 0.004 0.029 0.130 0.894 
Male parents education -0.079 0.067 -1.180 0.239 
Average education of female's parents -0.020 0.025 -0.800 0.424 
Female head education level 0.023 0.031 0.730 0.463 
Head education level -0.150 0.050 -2.970 0.003 
Poor (national poverty line) -7.327 2.811 -2.610 0.009 
PARTICIPATION 
Non-agriculture -0.048** 0.023 -2.130 0.033 
Agriculture 0.007 0.005 1.440 0.151 
Agricultural wage labor -0.034 0.021 -1.600 0.110 
Livestock 0.044*** 0.010 -4.55 0.001 
Social transfers -0.012 0.007 -1.710 0.088 
Self employed -0.005 0.015 -0.340 0.734 
Social assistance -0.013 0.010 -1.290 0.196 
Pension -0.005 0.003 -1.420 0.157 
     
HH COMPOSITION 
Female under 5 0.533 0.572 0.930 0.352 
Female 6-9 -0.688 0.465 -1.480 0.139 
Female 10-19 -0.482 0.564 -0.850 0.393 
Female 20-65 0.339 0.448 0.760 0.450 
Female over 65 -0.248 0.238 -1.040 0.298 
Male under 5 0.194 0.598 0.320 0.746 
Male 6-9 0.646 0.393 1.640 0.101 
Male 10-19 -0.499 0.577 -0.860 0.387 
Male 20-65 0.283 0.470 0.600 0.548 
Male over 65 -0.484 0.367 -1.320 0.188 
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Table 6. 2SLS Child Anthropometry Results 
With interview month and regional controls, in addition to the full set of household controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Height-for-age z-score   BMI-for-age z-score 
                    
Second Stage                   
Fem Share Inherited -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.026* -0.026*   0.022*** 0.021*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015)   (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) 
Ln Annual Exp per cap   0.007   0.039     0.155***   0.125 
    (0.058)   (0.065)     (0.052)   (0.077) 
Urban -0.177 -0.180 -0.116 -0.126   0.518*** 0.457*** 0.434** 0.397* 
  (0.178) (0.181) (0.196) (0.202)   (0.143) (0.140) (0.216) (0.209) 
Tobacco -0.589*** -0.592*** -0.572*** -0.587***   0.467*** 0.406*** 0.610*** 0.562** 
  (0.108) (0.109) (0.192) (0.192)   (0.112) (0.113) (0.231) (0.223) 
                    
Northern - - -0.340 -0.367   - - 1.278** 1.196** 
      (0.566) (0.566)       (0.583) (0.556) 
Central - - -0.277 -0.297   - - 0.667*** 0.606** 
      (0.211) (0.212)       (0.246) (0.236) 
First Stage                   
Constant -0.355 -0.420 -0.217 -0.571   0.190 -1.242 -0.309 -1.438 
  (0.647) (0.837) (0.769) (1.000)   (0.660) (0.849) (1.030) (1.277) 
                    
Matriliny 21.247*** 21.828*** 10.074*** 10.259***   21.204*** 21.783*** 10.37*** 10.569*** 
  (2.452) (2.503) (3.606) (3.617)   (2.442) (2.486) (3.588) (3.597) 
F-Stat 75.09 76.04 7.80 8.04   75.42 76.77 8.35 8.63 
  (1, 710) (1, 710) (1, 710) (1, 710)   (1, 713) (1, 713) (1, 713) (1, 713) 
Observations 4,605 4,605 4,605 4,605   4,701 4,701 4,701 4,701 
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Table 7. OLS Child Anthropometry Results 
With interview month and regional controls, in addition to the full set of household controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Height-for-age z-score BMI-for-age z-score 
Full 
Sample 
Matrilineal 
Only 
Patrilineal 
Only 
Full 
Sample 
Matrilineal 
Only 
Patrilineal 
Only 
Fem Share Inherited -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.002 0.001* 0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Tobacco -0.304*** -0.279*** -0.272* 0.100 0.032 0.193 
(0.078) (0.092) (0.145) (0.078) (0.088) (0.141) 
Urban -0.109 -0.123 0.112 0.396*** 0.402*** 0.178 
(0.131) (0.149) (0.179) (0.107) (0.121) (0.158) 
Northern 0.536*** 0.948** 0.337*** -0.308*** 0.117 0.130 
(0.086) (0.425) (0.119) (0.087) (0.164) (0.115) 
Central 0.049 0.043 0.077 0.079 0.027 0.243 
(0.080) (0.082) (0.197) (0.070) (0.073) (0.168) 
Constant -0.783 -1.039 0.092 0.628 0.651 -0.047 
(0.567) (0.695) (0.980) (0.523) (0.634) (0.770) 
Observations 4,605 3,455 1,150 4,701 3,539 1,162 
R-squared 0.038 0.037 0.060 0.047 0.053 0.064 
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Table 7. 2SLS Household Expenditure Shares 
With full set of household controls. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Food Clothing Housing Health Educ Alc/Tobacco 
Second Stage             
Fem Share Inherited -0.143** 0.041** 0.000 0.018 -0.007 -0.012 
  (0.065) (0.016) (0.000) (0.017) (0.010) (0.032) 
Tobacco -4.451*** 1.038*** 0.002 0.628** 0.018 -0.506 
  (1.082) (0.318) (0.007) (0.298) (0.166) (0.530) 
Urban -6.342*** 0.482* 0.015** -0.216 0.520*** -1.028** 
  (0.952) (0.247) (0.006) (0.182) (0.187) (0.420) 
Northern 0.218 1.875*** -0.041*** 0.236 0.001 -0.846 
  (2.442) (0.596) (0.015) (0.640) (0.360) (1.157) 
Central -1.348 0.295 -0.021*** 0.668** -0.056 0.602 
  (1.127) (0.290) (0.007) (0.309) (0.147) (0.474) 
Constant 84.554*** 4.652*** 0.153*** -0.656 -4.742*** 0.779 
  (3.952) (1.123) (0.025) (1.141) (0.508) (1.613) 
First Stage             
Matriliny 10.996*** 10.996*** 10.996*** 10.996*** 10.996*** 10.996*** 
  (2.82) (2.82) (2.82) (2.82) (2.82) (2.82) 
F-Stat 15.20 15.20 15.20 15.20 15.20 15.20 
df (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) 
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 
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Table 8. Log of Real Annual Total Expenditures on Food from Own-Crop Productions 
OLS Estimates with full set of controls. 
      
  (1) (2) 
    Matrilineal Only 
  
Ln Own-Crop Food 
Cons. 
Ln Own-Crop Food 
Cons. 
      
Fem Share Inherited 0.001* 0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobacco 0.240*** 0.259*** 
  (0.045) (0.049) 
Urban -0.305*** -0.303*** 
  (0.085) (0.103) 
Northern 0.576*** 0.655*** 
  (0.066) (0.103) 
Central 0.494*** 0.460*** 
  (0.051) (0.054) 
Constant 8.902*** 9.100*** 
  (0.312) (0.355) 
      
Observations 5,451 4,239 
R-squared 0.139 0.128 
* p≤.1; ** p≤.05; *** p≤.01 
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Table 9. Days Household Consumed Food by Type 
OLS estimates with interview month and regional controls, in addition to the full set of household controls. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Carbs 
Animal 
Products Fruits/Veg Cereal/Grain Roots/Tubers Meat Milk Fats 
                  
Fem Share Inherited 0.001* -0.004*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tobacco -0.168* 0.013 0.251* 0.115*** -0.283*** 0.127 -0.114 0.085 
  (0.097) (0.125) (0.146) (0.027) (0.092) (0.086) (0.071) (0.113) 
Urban 0.060 1.990*** 0.746*** -0.006 0.066 0.634*** 1.357*** 2.149*** 
  (0.155) (0.222) (0.230) (0.051) (0.147) (0.121) (0.158) (0.151) 
Northern 0.207 -0.062 -0.910*** -0.267*** 0.474*** -0.316** 0.254** -0.317* 
  (0.143) (0.193) (0.254) (0.075) (0.152) (0.126) (0.108) (0.190) 
Central -0.006 0.062 -0.186 -0.061** 0.055 -0.021 0.083 -0.474*** 
  (0.116) (0.127) (0.144) (0.028) (0.118) (0.093) (0.065) (0.106) 
Constant 7.505*** 1.254* 6.803*** 6.760*** 0.745 2.322*** -1.068** 0.283 
  (0.635) (0.755) (0.819) (0.193) (0.623) (0.549) (0.454) (0.728) 
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 
R-squared 0.149 0.124 0.133 0.031 0.144 0.072 0.118 0.181 
Carbs are defined as the sum of days that cereal/grains and roots/tubers were consumed. Animal products are defined as the number of days that meat and milk were 
consumed. 
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Table 10. 2SLS Indicator for Expenditures on Clothing (3-Month Recall) 
With interview month and regional controls, in addition to the full set of household controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Boys'  Girls'  Childs'  Infants'  
Adult 
Males'  
Adult 
Females'  
Second Stage             
Fem Share 
Inherited 0.002 0.004* 0.006** 0.002 0.004* 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tobacco 0.059** 0.082** 0.120*** 0.009 0.112*** 0.062* 
  (0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.021) (0.031) (0.034) 
Urban 0.000 0.041 0.073** 0.065*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 
  (0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.021) (0.033) (0.037) 
Northern 0.152** 0.158** 0.255*** 0.091* 0.197*** 0.210*** 
  (0.066) (0.072) (0.089) (0.050) (0.068) (0.075) 
Central 0.039 0.046 0.071* 0.040* 0.041 0.007 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.022) (0.031) (0.036) 
Constant 0.373*** 0.153 0.535*** 0.255*** 0.122 0.405*** 
  (0.124) (0.122) (0.143) (0.089) (0.123) (0.130) 
First Stage             
Matriliny 10.853*** 10.853*** 10.853*** 10.853*** 10.853*** 10.853*** 
  (2.814) (2.814) (2.814) (2.814) (2.814) (2.814) 
F-Stat 14.87 14.87 14.87 14.87 14.87 14.87 
df (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) (1, 733) 
Observations 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 6,215 
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Table 11. Wage Labor Participation 
OLS estimates with full controls 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Matrilineal Only Patrilineal Only 
  Male Female   Head Male Male Head Male Male 
Fem Share 
Inherited 0.002* 0.002   0.003* 0.003* -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.004)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Tobacco -1.140*** -1.003***   -1.281*** -1.226*** -1.197*** -0.980** 
  (0.184) (0.338)   (0.207) (0.199) (0.352) (0.450) 
Urban 1.510*** 1.157***   1.646*** 1.634*** 0.852*** 0.786*** 
  (0.264) (0.412)   (0.302) (0.291) (0.255) (0.249) 
Northern -0.080 -0.008   0.112 0.176 0.132 0.207 
  (0.154) (0.377)   (0.309) (0.301) (0.297) (0.291) 
Central 0.136 0.447*   0.060 0.131 0.133 0.251 
  (0.143) (0.252)   (0.152) (0.149) (0.426) (0.404) 
Constant -4.025*** -8.900***   -3.418*** -3.464*** -7.358*** -7.348*** 
  (0.876) (2.372)   (1.034) (1.016) (2.080) (1.948) 
Observations 6,060 5,777   4,475 4,590 1,403 1,470 
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Table 12. Effect of Inherited Assets on Income Control 
OLS with full set of household controls. 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
  Full Sample 
 
Matrilineal Only 
 
Patrilineal Only 
  
Female 
Control 
Joint 
Control 
Male 
Control   
Female 
Control 
Joint 
Control 
Male 
Control   
Female 
Control 
Joint 
Control 
Male 
Control 
                        
Fem Share Inherited 0.266*** 0.003 -0.269***   0.261*** 0.005 -0.265***   0.319*** -0.056 -0.263*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)   (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)   (0.041) (0.036) (0.040) 
Maize -4.769** 7.601*** -2.832   -2.154 5.660 -3.506   -5.392*** 5.079* 0.313 
  (1.975) (2.126) (2.407)   (3.420) (3.566) (4.264)   (2.030) (2.999) (2.852) 
Tobacco -7.858*** 24.374*** -16.515***   -8.357*** 25.578*** -17.221***   -5.326*** 19.251*** -13.925*** 
  (0.927) (1.713) (1.649)   (1.040) (1.939) (1.903)   (2.049) (3.057) (2.725) 
Urban -1.805 -10.529*** 12.334***   -1.783 -12.472*** 14.255***   -1.741 0.478 1.262 
  (1.393) (1.949) (2.342)   (1.639) (1.940) (2.431)   (2.199) (3.255) (3.158) 
Share Female 20-65 y.o. 0.251*** -0.107 -0.144   0.250*** -0.106 -0.144   0.235 -0.106 -0.129 
  (0.067) (0.083) (0.092)   (0.076) (0.089) (0.100)   (0.145) (0.189) (0.211) 
Share Male 20-65 y.o. -0.140** 0.027 0.113   -0.136** 0.017 0.119   -0.153 0.097 0.056 
  (0.058) (0.081) (0.087)   (0.067) (0.090) (0.095)   (0.116) (0.170) (0.200) 
Northern -0.093 4.684* -4.591**   0.918 -0.061 -0.856   -1.615 11.235*** -9.620*** 
  (1.224) (2.610) (2.315)   (4.168) (3.384) (4.140)   (1.901) (3.287) (3.110) 
Central -3.500*** 9.529*** -6.029***   -3.475*** 8.097*** -4.623***   -4.745* 22.140*** -17.395*** 
  (0.998) (1.209) (1.372)   (1.078) (1.286) (1.455)   (2.586) (3.387) (3.324) 
Constant 16.682** 0.433 82.885***   12.098 2.736 85.166***   24.904* 0.947 74.148*** 
  (6.888) (8.863) (9.663)   (8.236) (10.534) (11.209)   (13.893) (16.834) (20.574) 
                        
Observations 6,197 6,197 6,197   4,720 4,720 4,720   1,477 1,477 1,477 
R-squared 0.231 0.143 0.156   0.237 0.155 0.162   0.204 0.127 0.148 
 
